CONFERENCE REPORT: ESIL IGHIL Pre-Conference Event, Research Forum (Göttingen: University of Göttingen, 3 APR 2019) (by Jan LEMNITZER, IGHIL President)

The ESIL Interest Group History of International Law held its pre-conference workshop on "The Rule of Law and International Law in Historical Perspective" at the University of Goettingen on 3 April 2019.

The presenters moved backwards in chronology, with Denise Wohlwend (University of Fribourg (CH)) exploring the recent past of the ‘rule of law’ concept within the United Nations. The concept was established as an UN priority at the World Summit in 2005 (that famously also birthed the concept of R2P), which led to the founding of the rule of law assistance unit in the Secretariat and a series of debates in the 6th Committee of the General Assembly. Predictably, the fact that there is no agreed definition of what ‘rule of law’ means led to a series of debates within the committee as to what precisely the concept entails. While some states saw it as one of the main principle of political morality, others favoured a more legalistic approach and insisted it was primarily about the foundations of a functioning legal order, such as states following court decisions, the separation of power or adherence to international law. The more detailed the debates got, the more disagreements appeared: should the rule of law be seen as a key tool to establishing stability in transitional justice processes, or does that denigrate the concepts since it should always be seen as a value in itself? Wohlwend ended by suggesting the framework of a ‘contested concept’ to further the debate while acknowledging the obvious disagreements. In a lively and well-informed exchange with the presenter, Hannah Birkenkötter (Humboldt University Berlin) pointed out that a lot of the real action on the rule of law was not in the GA debates, but the annual reports of the General Secretary, and that the secretariat had managed to hide a number of activities under the rule of law label that would otherwise have been controversial among member states. Both agreed that ‘rule of law’ seems to have replaced the earlier ubiquitous use of ‘democracy’, perhaps since it was deemed more appropriate to a post-Iraq War world.

The next presenter, Premislaw Tacik (Jagellionian University, Cracow), explored the ways in which the ‘rule of law’ concept has been employed in the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. Given the traditional disputes with Russia, but especially the more recent conflicts with the governments in Poland and Hungary, this is a highly political question. Tacik argued that the Court avoided legal theory on the issue, but often invokes the preamble of the Convention as a ‘guiding principle of interpretation’. In practice, this can mean both the identification of the rule of law as basic equality before the law and the provision of legal protections, but also the endorsement of ‘thick’ interpretations of the concept that see the rule of law as the guarantor of democracy and human rights. In the discussion, session chair and IG convenor Jan Lemnitzer (University of Southern Denmark) noted that the court seemed to sometimes engage in the defence of lofty principles while at other times focused its decisions on seemingly small procedural details. Tacik agreed that we need a conceptual bridge between both levels, since in reality they can not be separated in the court’s struggle with those governments that are determined to disrespect the rule of law.

In the second panel, Ryan Mitchell (Chinese University of Hong Kong) explored the political thinking of Hans Kelsen and pointed out that scholars tend to focus too much on his early writings establishing a vision of the rule of law built around the pacta sunt servanda principle, while ignoring his later works. Here, Kelsen needed to deal with the tension that he supported the Nuremberg trials and the ideas behind them, but that his endorsement of a legal system that is capable of defining a new crime (aggression) and establishing individual guilt of those who had committed it before the binding definition meant a real crisis for his system of legal thought. After initially publishing rather poor arguments such as that those who committed particularly horrific crimes lose the right not to be prosecuted in dubious ways, Kelsen changed his thinking (partly influenced by his controversial positions during the Korean War) and now highlighted the fact that a norm without a sanction is not a norm in a meaningful sense.

Finally, Alan Nissel began by pointing out that the history of arbitration as it currently stands focuses on a small number of prominent cases involving the United States or Britain. He argued that the large number of cases in Latin America in the 19^th and early 20^th century are particularly revealing since they often involved disputes between Western investors or creditors and local interests. The pattern that emerges upon a closer look is a rule of law mask for capitalist interests that strongly favoured European or American investors while expecting the locals to be pleased that arbitration had begun to replace armed state intervention. These developments are not just of historical interest since the logic employed in these cases became highly influential in the formation of the modern doctrine of state responsibility, a cornerstone of contemporary international law. As Jan Lemnitzer pointed out in his panel summary, this type of research is particularly welcome since it add  to our empirical foundation for two separate developments in our field: a rethinking of the history of arbitration, and a lifting of the boundary between public international law and the history of private international law and investment disputes.

The next meeting of the IG History of International Law will take place just before the Annual conference in Athens in September and look at ‘New Histories of Sovereigns and Sovereignty’ – the call for papers is still open until 30 April!

CONFERENCE REPORT: Politics and the Histories of International Law (Heidelberg, MPIL, 15-16 FEB 2019)

(image source: ESCLH Blog)

The ESCLH Blog published a conference report on the JHIL/MPIL conference Politics and the Histories of International Law (see programme earlier on this blog).

First paragraph:

Telling a history of international law is every time a mode of echoing oneself in the present. The danger of a single story and its oppressive force to identities and peoples that are misrepresented or not represented in it have been stressed in recent years by many scholars, but not only them. It was perhaps most remarkably and famously spelled out by the Nigerian novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie in a TED talk already ten years ago: “I loved these American and British books I have read [as a child], they stirred my imagination and opened up new worlds for me. But their unintended consequence was that I did not know that people like me could exist in literature.”

Read more on the ESCLH Blog.

CONFERENCE REPORT: The Parisian peace treaties (1919-1920) and the emergence of modern international law (JHIL/Tilburg University, 17 May 2018) (by Prof. dr. Miloš Vec/Univ. Vienna-IMW)

Prof. dr. Miloš Vec (Univ. Vienna/IMW) published a conference report on the JHIL symposium "The Parisian Peace Treaties (1919-1920) and the emergence of modern international law (see earlier on this blog). The text appears in today's Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, nr. 152, p. 3 and can be read here above, by clicking on the image.

CONFERENCE REPORT: International Law and the Long Nineteenth Century (University of Leuven, November 24-25, 2016) by Ana Delić, Tilburg University

(Image source: F. Dhondt)

Leading scholars as well as junior researchers met in the historic faculty of Leuven University to discuss international law in the long nineteenth century. The event began with a warm welcome by the university’s dean, Prof. Bernard Tilleman who revealed a most interesting anecdote for the international legal historians assembled: the Peace of Versailles had obliged Germany to restore the library of the university. This was followed by warm welcome addresses by Prof. Randall Lesaffer and Dr. Inge van Hulle, the organizers of this well-orchestrated event.

Day One

Panel One: The Eighteenth-Century Fall-Out of Nineteenth-Century International Law (Chair: Randall Lesaffer)

Member of the International Court of Justice, James Crawford considered the basis on which France participated in the Congress of Vienna, the status of Napoleon during the Hundred Days and the legal basis for French responsibility for war damages resulting from the Hundred Days. Crawford eloquently argued that the Bourbon dynasty was legitimized by the prevailing monarchic theory of sovereign power. On the other hand, the status of Napoleon during the Hundred Days was less clear. Certainly, he was not a head of state and as such the basis of reparation for damages incurred by France during this period was discussed on the basis of the theory of responsibility.

Camilla Boisen argued that Edmund Burke bridged the two concerns of international law: authority and enforcement. It was Burke who provided the conceptual scope needed to resolve the issues of enforcement by prescribing specific common law foundations, binding the legal and the moral in international law and presenting it as domestic law.

Inge van Hulle explored a case-study: the legal connections and regimes that developed between British imperial agents and indigenous African communities living in West Africa in the period prior to the Scramble. Anglo-African international relations initially developed on the basis of mutuality and relative equality between parties, but simultaneously, there were imperial legal techniques as well(e.g. extraterritorial jurisdiction, anti-slave trade treaties, the extension of protection to African communities).

(image source: F. Dhondt)

Panel Two: Neutrality (Chair: Inge Van Hulle)
Frederik Dhondt’s discussed how Belgium’s compulsory neutrality  of the 1810 to the 1830s was just one out of multiple tools to guarantee ‘le repos de tous’ and in reality was mostly superficial. Belgium’s compulsory neutrality arose out of a particular socio-historical context –the expansionist and revisionary stance of Napoleon III- and resulted in an interesting reception, including  the view of it as an economic advantage, a legitimation of colonialism, and foremost as a threatened status.

Shavana Musa examined the law of neutrality focusing on the conflicts during the Latin American Wars of Independence. The role of neutrality was discussed as the means of enhancing imperial and commercial power, as a peace-making tool and as a body of law that provided individual (justiciable) rights within the international sphere.

Viktorija Jakimovska’s discussed how throughout the Greek War of Independence, Great Britain generally avoided being dragged into a war but it eventually wished to influence the outcome of the conflict. From 1826-1827, Britain failed to adhere to the essentialia neutralitatis notwithstanding the fact that it never officially renounced the neutrality of its conduct.

Panel Three: Historiography of International Law (Chair: Frederik Dhondt)
 Miloš Vec’s pinpointed key historiographic trends of the nineteenth-century including sources of international law, the conception of the public law of Europe, the so-called shift to a so-called global international law, the regulation of warfare and new technologies around 1900, and state practice.

Jan Lemnitzer examined how the 1850s was a crucial decade in transforming the system of the European law of nations into a universal system of international law. The proliferation of multilateral law-making treaties with the Declaration of Paris in 1856, the growth of international trade, and the rise of independent Latin American states resulted in further contacts between European and non-European states. However, the rise of exclusion in international law was exemplified by the spread of detailed rules for ‘civilized war.’

Day Two

Panel One:  Professionalization and International Law (Chair: Gabriela Frei)

 Stephen Neff discussed how the Darwinian revolution gave rise to American anthropologist Lewis Henry Morgan’s three-fold categorisation of human societies as savage, barbarous and civilised. This found a reflection in the international-law writing of James Lorimer buttressed by imperialistic policies of the European states and, generally, a hierarchical outlook on the part of international lawyers. Evolutionary thought also influenced a revival of natural-law modes of thought as the only acceptable normative regulation of relations between civilised and savage states. In stark opposition to the evolutionary scheme was diffusionism exemplified by Herbert Spencer’s theory of a general progression from militaristic to industrial modes of life. Diffusionism did not gain much traction with nineteenth century international lawyers.

Vincent Genin analysed how the Institut de Droit International (founded in 1873) represents the first major step in the institutionalization of the discipline. The speaker  discussed how in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the IDI juggled between its self-affirmed role as the ‘public conscience of the civilized world’ versus historic tides of nationalism, the multiplication of conflicts and colonial rivalries.

Ana Delić discussed the formative interactions between comparative law and private international law during the modern period. Comparative law was instrumental to modern private international law in the civil law and common law traditions in three ways: 1) scholars studied private international legal approaches comparatively; 2) the comparative approach was a key aspect of preliminary materials aiding in private international law-making; and 3) courts relied on a comparative study of conflicting rules in order to assess which is the applicable law or jurisdiction.

(image source: F. Dhondt)

Panel Two: Empire and the Periphery in the Nineteenth Century (Chair: Camilla Boisen)
Andrew Fitzmaurice explored the standing of non-European nations in the work of the nineteenth century jurist Sir Travers Twiss. Archival materials were presented which painted a colourful picture of Twiss’ personal life, including his marriage to a prostitute. This union eventually destroyed his career. In terms of Twiss’ legacy to international legal history, he had advocated the view that non-European states (including China, Japan, the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and the ‘African Slave-states’) were equals with European powers in the law of nations. His view sprung not from humanitarian concerns but from a concern for the duties (and not rights) of these nations.

Stefan Kroll discussed the Shanghai International Settlement (1863-1943), a zone within the area of Shanghai which was detracted from the authority of Chinese rule, and which was controlled by the self-government of foreign merchants (the Municipal Council). While the mixed court was expected to apply Chinese norms, in reality, foreign norms and judicial practices were being introduced. The Su bao-case (1903) illustrates the mixing of legal systems within the merchant court. This case concerned political radicalism against the Chinese government.

Luigi Nuzzo presented an Italian history of international law, focusing on Pasquale Stanislao Mancini and his pragmatic approach to international law. Mancini’s imprint on international law is exemplified by his insistence on the principle of nationality but his legacy has not been given its proper due. Analysing forensic memories, legislative deeds, parliamentary speeches, editorial projects rather than doctrinal works provides further food for thought with regards to his contribution.

Panel Three: Individuals and International Law (Chair: Andrew Fitzmaurice)
Gabriela Frei examined the biography of Sir William Jones, a judge at his Majesty’s supreme court of judicature at Fort William, the citadel of Calcutta in Bengal, and a well-known orientalist of the eighteenth century. Jones also wrote the first English translation of Hindu and Muslim laws, and thus made those texts available to the Western world. He believed that only local laws would allow a basis for a fair and just legal system. The paper also discussed the multiple legal systems co-existing at this period in Bengal, which developed legal standards for the commercial enterprise of the East India Company.

(image source: F. Dhondt)

Raphael Cahen retraced the beginning of the Mahmoud Ben Ayed case (1855-1858) through an examination of documents from the archives of Joseph Marie Portalis, a famous judge and diplomat, who had been charged to administer the case. This case involved the extradition of Mahmoud Ben Ayad from France back to Tunisia. Ben Ayad, a famous Caïd and minister of commerce, was charged with embezzlement of state funds.

Raymond Kubben analyzed the conception of statehood within international legal textbooks of the long nineteenth century. The definition of the state in the early period were varied and typically reverted to abstract Roman law or philosophical concepts such as civitas or communitas perfecta. Over the course of the nineteenth century, textbooks would specify the legal concept, slowly forming definitions akin to the one in the 1933 Montevideo Convention.

CONFERENCE REPORT: "The Vienna Congress and the Transformation of International Law" (HSozKult, 29 Mar 2016)

(image: Poppelsdorfer Schloss, source: Wikimedia Commons)

HSozKult published a conference report by Chirstophe Wampach (Bonn University, Institute for German and Rhineland Legal History) on the Conference "The Vienna Congress and the Transformation of International Law", held in Bonn on 3-4 September 2015 (see earlier on this blog).

First paragraph:

200 years after the European Great Powers convened in Vienna to discuss the post-Napoleonic era, Miloš Vec, professor of legal and constitutional history at the University of Vienna, and Mathias Schmoeckel, professor of legal history at the University of Bonn, called for an international and interdisciplinary conference to examine the implications of the Congress of 1815 in international law and conflict resolution. Indeed, whereas the political importance of the Congress of Vienna has very often been emphasised in the historical research, its legal aspects, on the contrary, have been left untold for too long. The conference took place on 3rd and 4th September 2015 at the Poppelsdorf Palace (Poppelsdorfer Schloss) in Bonn (Germany) and was financed by both the universities of Vienna and Bonn, and the LOEWE Research Focus ‘Extrajudicial and Judicial Conflict Resolution’ (LOEWE-Schwerpunkt „Außergerichtliche und gerichtliche Konfliktlösung“).

Fulltext here or on HNet.

COMPTE RENDU DE CONFERENCE: le Congrès de Vienne, 1814-1815: Bilan et Perspectives (Paris : Institut Historique Allemand, 15-16 juin 2015)

(image: Institut Historique Allemand; source: hypotheses.org)

La conférence "Le Congrès de Vienne, 1814-1815: Bilan et Perspectives", organisée à Paris par l'Institut Historique Allemand et le Forum Culturel Autrichien, avec le soutien des Archives Diplomatiques du Ministère français des Affaires Étrangères et du Développement International, a fait l'objet d'une annonce précédente sur ce blog.

Le compte rendu ci-dessus en résume les communications. Auteurs : Frederik DHONDT (Chargé de recherches du Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique – Flandre (FWO) – Institut d’Histoire du Droit,Université de Gand) (première partie) et Raphael CAHEN (ATER, Centre d’ÉtudesPolitiques Contemporaines (CEPOC), Université d’Orléans) (seconde partie).

I.

La journée du 15 juin fut ouverte par le professeur Reinhard STAUBER (Klagenfurt), qui présida un premier panel, consacré aux acteurs et leurs perspectives. Le premier orateur fut Mark JARRETT (Stanford), qui traita des Cent Jours, vu à partir des actions de Castlereagh en faveur de la contre-révolution. Les Cent Jours furent le premier « test case » d’une intervention alliée dans les affaires intérieures d’un autre Etat. Le Whig Samuel Whitebread reprocha au Régent et à Castlereagh d’intervenir ainsi dans la souveraineté de la France. Pour Jarett, deux questions sont essentielles : 1° comment Castlereagh reagit-il lors de l’évasion de Napoléon de l’Île d’Elbe ? 2° Que fit Castlereagh alors pour aider Louis XVIII ? Selon Jarrett, le gouvernement anglais manquait terriblement d’information pertinente, et remplit les lacunes en se basant sur ses propres jugements à priori. La Grande Bretagne aida Louis XVIII, bien plus que n’importe quel acteur allié. Cependant, ce soutien ne fut que conditionnel : Louis XVIII fut exhorté à entamer des réformes, ce qu’il ne fit pas assez. Tout comme l’argument de la souveraineté française fut utilisé par les Whigs, Castlereagh essaya de diminuer les ardeurs du duc de Wellington, afin d’éviter la perception en France d’une dynastie Bourbon soutenue que par l’étranger. Tout soutien anglais se devait d’être discret. Louis XVIII reçut les instructions de rester en France, pendant que le Congrès dut se prononcer à nouveau contre Napoléon et pour une « consultation » du roi Bourbon (art. 8, Traité du 25 mars 1815). Louis XVIII fut instruit de renvoyer  le comte de Blacas, fidèle d’avant la Révolution, de nommer Talleyrand comme premier ministre, de prendre le régicide et bonapartiste Fouché dans le gouvernement, d’attribuer ses compétences aux ministres et de les rendre responsables devant le parlement, comme en Angleterre. Finalement, de réunir ces dernières dans le Midi de la France, et s’y rendre personnellement. 

            Ensuite, Raphael CAHEN (Orléans) traita de Frédéric  Gentz. Ce personnage fut au centre de nombreuses spéculations et approximations littéraires autant qu’historiographiques. Élève de Kant à Königsberg, auteur  du Historisches Journal, et d’un traité Zum Ewigen Friede. Il fut traduit du Portugal jusqu’en Suède, en passant par l’Angleterre et la  Hollande, sans oublier la Russie et les  Etats-Unis. Il quitte le service administratif et diplomatique de la Prusse pour Vienne en 1802, par hargne contre la paix de Bâle, qui réconcilia la Prusse avec la France. Figure typique du monde cosmopolite des élites transnationales de la Restauration, Gentz noua des contacts avec Cobbett, Louis Philippe d’Orléans, Goethe ou Schiller. Sa théorie politique se retrouve en grande partie  dans  trois essais: Sur la paix perpétuelle, l’État de l’Europe avant et après la révolution française et les Fragments de l’histoire moderne de l’équilibre politique de l’Europe. Il se dit contre la monarchie universelle, contre l’état commercial fermé prôné par Fichte et réalise une synthèse entre la Realpolitik et le monde des idées. Il aspire à ce que le droit public de l’Europe  atteigne un haut degré d’ordre juridique, et se constitue formellement. Ni totalement rénovateur, ni tout à fait conservateur, il prône un conservatisme libéral par des réformes. Son plan européen se résume à une ligue de onze États européens avec un congrès général comme  colonne vertébrale. Quand on le voit exulter l’ « insertion » du droit public de l’Europe au Congrès de Vienne par Talleyrand, il est difficile de ne pas remarquer le contraste avec son mémoire de février 1815 (écrit pour Metternich), dans lequel il ridiculise le congrès, lequel  n’aurait donné lieu qu’à de simples découpages territoriaux  entre souverains. Pour autant, il jugea globalement positivement le système des Congrès tel qu’il s’est développé jusqu’en 1823/1825. Cependant, même si le système avait réussit à sécuriser la liberté modérée, si l’on pense aux régimes constitutionnels français ou anglais,  il fut surtout selon Gentz une construction humaine, en besoin constant d’adaptation. Au fond, le bohème cosmopolite Gentz, un des seuls acteurs de premier plan né en dehors du milieu aristocrate, en fut en même temps le penseur, l’artisan et le critique.

            Le professeur Michael ROHRSCHNEIDER (Cologne) présenta ensuite la collection « Gentz Digital » (http://gentz-digital.ub.uni-koeln.de), fruit d’un projet à la bibliothèque universitaire de Cologne. La collection léguée par l’homme politique Herterich, assemblée pendant des décennies partout en Europe, a donné lieu à une édition standardisée de 2.700 lettres, dont plus de la moitié n’ont jamais fait l’objet d’une publication avant. Les diverses possibilités de recherche (recherche par destinataire, recherche chronologique, registre), ainsi que les introductions contextuelles en font un outil considérable pour la recherche sur le Congrès et l’époque de Friedrich Gentz. 

            La deuxième session, dédiée au Congres et la « périphérie » commença par une intervention de Claudia REICHL-HAM (Musée militaire à Vienne). Elle mettait en perspective la confrontation géopolitique entre les Habsbourg et les Ottomans, du siège de Vienne (1683) à la première guerre mondiale. La paix de Bucarest de 1812 entre l’Empire Ottoman et le Tsar attribua la Moldavie et une partie de la Géorgie à ce dernier. Après la campagne de Russie de Napoléon (1812-1813), le Tsar prit la défense des orthodoxes au sein de l’Empire Ottoman. Ceci créa des tensions avec Metternich et l’Empire des Habsbourg. Contrairement à la politique traditionnelle de confrontation dans les Balkans, en 1821, Metternich voulut éviter que la Russie n’intervienne pour affaiblir le Sultan. La crainte du nationalisme grec et ses effets dévastateurs pour l’état multinational que dirigeait l’empereur François fut trop grande. L’indépendance grecque (1821-1830) se fit sans soutien actif de Vienne. Ainsi, les deux pôles de confrontation entre les Ottomans et les Empires russe et Habsbourg furent en place. L’accueil du Sultan au sein du Concert de l’Europe par le Traité de Paris (1856) fut le signe pour l’Autriche de se réaligner sur Bucarest et Belgrade.

            Ensuite, Friedemann PESTEL (Freiburg) traita d’une perspective encore plus éloignée : celle du changement de régime dans les colonies françaises des Antilles. Un corpus considérable de revues, de pamphlets et de correspondance donne une image riche et nuancée d’une perspective extra-européenne sur la Restauration (1814-1815) et le Congrès de Vienne. La question de l’ « impossible Ancien Régime colonial » contraste avec l’histoire extrêmement mouvementée des insurrections noires et des conflits armées, qui permirent à Haiti d’occuper Saint-Domingue. Esclavage, noblesse, pouvoirs du chef de l’Etat, reconnaissance internationale, amnistie ou rapports avec les gouvernements successifs de Louis XVIII font un mélange complexe et intriguant. 

            La troisième session, Résultats, commença par une communication de Kathrin KINNINGER (Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienne) sur les aspects formels de l’Acte Final du congrès. Non moins de 300 chartes sont conservées à Viennes concernant le congrès. La Bulle d’Or et l’Acte Final sont par ailleurs les seules pièces de la collection reprises au Patrimoine Mondial de l’Unesco. Le 9 juin 1815, un premier concept fut rédigé, mais le processus d’échange des ratifications (pour lequel l’acte final fut en réalité trop grand pour l’insérer) dura jusqu’en 1820. 

            Ensuite, le professeur MILOŠ VEC (Vienne) essaya de nuancer la vision du Congrès de Vienne comme une étape de la juridicisation  des relations internationales. Les juristes ont tendance à analyser l’histoire comme un récit linéaire vers toujours plus de régulation. Cependant, il y a un déficit empirique, en ce que nous ne savons pas assez sur l’évolution concrète, quantitative et qualitative de l’ « extension » du domaine du droit. Il faudrait opposer « juridicisation » et « Rechtsvermeidung » ou stratégies d’éviter une régulation juridique d’activités politiques ou sociétales. Par exemple, ce ne fut qu’en 1901 qu’Hennis Taylor, dans son traité de droit international public, parla de « quasi-législation » lors de conférences internationales. Pour la fin du XIXe siècle, c’eût été exact. Cependant, ces « law-making treaties » ou traités-loi ne peuvent pas être rétroprojectés. Les conférences régulières depuis 1648 ne constituèrent point un « aéropage des Nations », comme l’exprimait Friedrich Liszt. L’objectif du Congrès de Vienne fut « d’unir l’Europe à travers des traités, en vue d’un objectif commun », ou comme le publiciste Lassa Oppenheim le reprit au début du XXe siècle, « de créer un nouvel ordre, et un équilibre des pouvoirs frais ». Cependant, cet équilibre fut bien problématique. Jean Louis Kluber déniait au principe d’équilibre des pouvoirs toute nature décisive en droit des gens. Seuls les traités positifs purent créer des normes. Pareillement, Henry Wheaton trouvait la doctrine d’équilibre des pouvoirs très délicate, relevant de la politique, plutôt que du droit international. Alphonse Rivier ou Heinrich Oppenheim furent du même avis. Ensuite, il faudrait distinguer les règles concrètes des principes. Ces derniers se situent à un méta-niveau et ont rapport aux structures fondamentales, aux questions de justice. Leur application donne des résultats spontanés, mais non prévisibles. L’équilibre des pouvoirs, selon Bulmerincq ou von Martens, ne constitue alors point un principe, mais plutôt une critique du droit des gens. Tout au plus, il forma le narratif de justification primaire pour les interventions dans la souveraineté d’États tiers. Henry Maine, dans les Whewell lectures on International Law, fit l’équation suivante : (A) les grandes puissances sont opposées à la souveraineté populaire et au constitutionalisme (B) un équilibre entre eux préserve ces positions, ce qui fait que (C) l’équilibre des pouvoirs ne peut constituer un principe de droit. Quid du congrès de Vienne alors ? Strupp le réduit à une mission politique, garantir un résultat en termes de répartition de pouvoir. Hall le réduisit à une référence sur les voies navigables. Le droit des gens se construit sur l’auto-obligation des acteurs. Le droit représente une direction universelle de légitimité de l’action politique. Les États ont tendance à éviter l’imposition du droit sur leurs actions. Il y a une tendance à partir de 1815, mais on ne peut la comparer à la période ultérieure du XIXe siècle tardif.

            Le dernier orateur fut Michel KÉRAUTRET (Assemblée Nationale). Sa communication traita le débat sur le congrès de Vienne à la fin du XIXe siècle, plus précisément à travers le prisme de l’alliance franco-russe, conclue en 1891. Déjà en 1814-1815, Talleyrand aurait recherché l’alliance du Tsar contre l’Autriche dans la discussion sur le sort de la Saxe. Louis XVIII, par ses liens familiaux, soutenait ce dernier monarque contre les prétentions du roi de Prusse, qui voulut mettre la main dessus. Ceci afin d’assurer le Tsar du Grand-Duché de Varsovie, promis dans un stade antérieur à la Prusse. La piste d’une alliance franco-russe fut abandonnée le 3 janvier 1815, quand Castlereagh signa une alliance avec la France. De fait, Talleyrand avait réussi à faire sortir la Grande-Bretagne du giron de l’alliance anti-française. La décision d’ainsi laisser tomber une combinaison russe fut déplorée par Pasquier, et plus tard par Thiers et Delcastel. La Russie fut le meilleur soutien de Louis XVIII et la maison de Bourbon. Talleyrand aurait dépréciée la politique française, ou l’aurait rendue stérile, en soutenant ses « ennemis naturels » anglo-autrichiens et donc en ôtant à la France ces grandes ambitions potentielles. Pozzo di Borgo aurait offert son soutien à Talleyrand pour annexer une partie de la rive gauche du Rhin, mais en vain. L’Autriche et la Grande Bretagne auraient été laissées à la direction du Concert de l’Europe. Ceci alors que le soutien du Tsar fut essentiel en 1860, afin d’éviter un véto anglais de l’acquisition par Napoléon III de Nice et la Savoie. La publication en 1894 des mémoires de Pasquier coïncidait avec l’alliance franco-russe. Dans l’historiographie française du XIXe siècle tardif, le groupe autour de l’Institut, d’Haussonville ou de Broglie soutenaient cependant une alliance anglaise, rejoints par les orléanistes. Les légitimistes, par contre, furent en faveur d’une alliance russe. Ainsi, les clivages politiques français du XIXe siècle se recoupent avec la question de l’alliance avec le Tsar. Jusqu’aujourd’hui, la droite gaulliste soutient la Russie, la droite atlantiste ou les socio-démocrates choisissant la position occidentale sur l’Ukraine. 

II.

Dans sa conférence du soir, introduite par le Professeur Thomas MAISSEN (IHA), le Professeur Heinz DUCHHARDT (IEG Mainz) a souligné l’aspect global des décisions autour du Congrès de Vienne, à l’image du contrat commercial du Royaume Uni avec le roi du Sénégal dans le cadre de la fin de la traite ou encore de l’île de Ceylan reprise aux hollandais. Ou encore de la rencontre des émissaires anglais et américains à Gand en 1814 à l’issu de la « seconde guerre d’indépendance ».

Enfin, il a rappelé que dès la deuxième paix de Paris les principes du concert européen et le droit d’intervention étaient posés mais que le système européen avait changé de nature après les révolutions sud-américaines et l’émergence de la doctrine Monroe de non-intervention.

Comme bilan du Congrès, il note un nouvel ordre des choses en Europe, de nouvelles règles de diplomatie et la liberté de circulation des fleuves. C’est aussi le début de l’époque de l’impérialisme.

Dans son commentaire, le Professeur Jacques Olivier BOUDON (Paris-Sorbonne) rappelle l’importance des Cent-jours et le fait que l’acte final du Congrès de Vienne fut signé alors que l’Europe était de nouveau en guerre. Il trouve particulièrement intéressant la perspective de la Global history laquelle permet de décentrer le regard vers une histoire mondiale de la paix. Il note que déjà l’historiographie de la révolution atlantique avait insisté sur la longue durée et la globalité des phénomènes. Il souligne ensuite l’importance de la Pax Britannica  et le rôle du marché global dans les discussions sur l’abolition de la traite. Il cite l’exemple du Sénégal où à partir de 1817 la traite loin de disparaître augmente au contraire, ce qui est un exemple parmi d’autres du peu d’impact de la déclaration générale d’abolition de la traite de l’Acte final. Pour lui également l’orient (sous-entendu l’empire ottoman) état présent dans toutes les têtes sans participer officiellement aux négociations de 1814-1815. Enfin, il souligne également l’importance des empires et l’émergence de nouvelles pratiques internationales d’un droit humanitaire et de nouvelles règles concernant les prisonniers de guerre. 

Duchhardt reprend la parole et insiste sur le fait que l’Inde était une zone de contact russo-anglaise, il souligne à son tour l’augmentation de la traité après 1815 et l’importance de l’historiographie de la révolution atlantique. Plusieurs questions sont soulevées à l’image de l’importance des constitutions internes des Etats. Duchhardt rappelle que l’idée de constitution est présente dans l’Acte final de même que l’idée de Nation. Tout comme l’idée du principe monarchique. Il questionne ensuite le concept de Restauration et remet en cause l’idée que la génération du Congrès de Vienne n’aurait pas du tout pris en compte les mouvements constitutionnels en rappelant les exemples norvégiens, suédois, puis les discussion à Londres après la révolution belge. Enfin, un concert du Kreisler-Trio Wien, ponctué par des commentaires du fameux critique musical Wilhelm Sinkovicz, a clôturé cette belle et fructueuse journée de travail. 

Le lendemain, la première session, sous la présidence de Michel KERAUTRET, était consacrée au Congrès de Vienne comme événement et forum. Monica KURZEL-RUNTSCHEINER (Kaiserliche Wagenburg Vienne) nous a ainsi présenté le rôle des carrosses pendant le congrès en insistant sur la signification du Congrès pour la ville de Vienne. A travers la correspondance du comte de Trauttmansdorff responsable de l’organisation, Mme Kurzel-Runtschneiner a minutieusement rappelé toute la logistique du Congrès. Pour faire face à l’arrivée de 40 000 à 100 000 étrangers supplémentaires la ville de 350 000 habitants a mis en place un système de voiture avec un service de location opérant 24h/24h. 170 nouvelles voitures ont ainsi été construites pour l’occasion. D’autre part, alors même que les finances de l’Autriche étaient depuis l’occupation de 1805 et 1809 et à la suite des guerres de coalition en mauvaise état, le coût du Congrès s’est avéré trois fois plus élevé que prévu. De plus, la sécurité ne semble pas avoir été une question pour les autorités, les monarques ayant été souvent décrits par les contemporains qui avaient participé aux fêtes publiques comme des « enfants en vacances ». Enfin, les viennois ont augmenté de manière drastique le prix des loyers pour les étrangers. 

Marion KOSCHIER (Klagenfurt) a ensuite poursuivi la session sur le rôle des banquiers pendant le Congrès. Elle a rappelé au préalable la situation déplorable des finances publiques non seulement en Autriche mais également en Prusse et au Danemark, sans oublier l’inflation en Russie et en Espagne. En 1815, le centre des finances européennes s’était incontestablement déplacé d’Amsterdam vers Londres. Des grandes familles à l’image des Rothschild et des frères Baring ont joué un rôle fondamental dans la construction d’un système de paix européen à travers les congrès de 1815 à 1823. Ainsi ces « agents professionnels » à l’image de Bollmann (agent de Baring) sont devenus des membres incontournables de réseaux transnationaux innovants d’échanges informels et institutionnalisés. Bollmann avait ainsi proposé d’exporter du mercure en Amérique du Sud ou encore diffusé un pamphlet sur les finances publiques dans lequel il préconise la création de banques nationales (en Autriche elle sera bien crée en 1816). De même, il effectue à la même époque du Lobbying en faveur de la mise en place de ligne de bateaux à vapeur. 

Florian KERSCHBAUMER (Klagenfurt) a présenté ensuite la pensée des « présocialistes » européens en se penchant notamment sur l’ouvrage de Saint-Simon et Thierry De la réorganisation de la société européenne (1814). Dans son livre dédié au Tsar Alexandre, les deux auteurs se font les précurseurs d’une Europe unie avec un parlement européen à deux chambres sur le modèle anglais. Ils annoncent également une « époque dorée » à venir et vont obtenir un grand succès commercial. Au même moment William Godwin publie également des articles utopistes dans la presse anglaise tandis que Robert Owen va chercher pendant le Congrès d’Aix-la-Chapelle à sensibiliser les élites aux questions sociales à l’image du temps de travail et de l’interdiction du travail des enfants. De même, il envoie deux essais sur ces questions aux gouvernements européens et américains. Mais, même si Owen a obtenu des rendez-vous avec la sœur du Tsar, la délégation anglaise et Friedrich Gentz, les élites n’ont pas donné suite à ses propositions.    

 

Sarah LENTZ (Brême) a ensuite présenté ses recherches doctorales en cours sur le rôle de la délégation prussienne au Congrès de Vienne sur la question de l’abolition de la traite à travers la correspondance diplomatique entre les diplomates anglais et prussiens. Elle a notamment rappelé le rôle central de William Wilbeforce dans les réseaux abolitionnistes pour illustrer son propos. 

Enfin Silvia RICHTER (Berlin) est revenue sur la question de l’émancipation des juifs au Congrès de Vienne par le biais de l’exemple de Guillaume de Humboldt. Elle a ainsi rappelé les divers réseaux notamment ceux de Baruch pour les juifs de Francfort et de Buchholz pour ceux des villes de la Hanse. Puis, Silvia RICHTER a insisté sur l’ambivalence des intellectuels à l’époque à l’image de Humboldt proche des salons d’Henriette Herz et Rahel Levin à Berlin mais très critique vis-à-vis des juifs dans ses écrits. Enfin, la déclaration de principe du Congrès de Vienne a eu un effet contraire. Puisque le Ghetto est réintroduit à Francfort et les juifs n’ont pas obtenu de fait l’émancipation civile et politique. Même si, il y a bien une émancipation culturelle et financière surtout à Vienne et à Paris. 

Le Professeur Heinz DUCHHARDT a conclu la journée par des «considérations subjectives ». Pour lui, il est clair qu’il ne faut plus employer la particule « von » pour désigner Friedrich Gentz. Puisque son titre de noblesse suédois n’a jamais été reconnu en Autriche et il est né et resté, au fond, toute sa vie un intellectuel « bourgeois bohème ». Il conviendrait de continuer à accorder plus d’importance aux « personnages secondaires » à l’image de Wacken ou encore Hoffmann qui tenait le protocole de la commission des statistiques. De même le rôle de Friedrich Schlegel ou encore des « acteurs professionnels » à l’image de Bollmann de la délégation des libraires de Cotta ou encore celle des abolitionnistes de même que les « pré socialistes » devraient être plus étudiés en cherchant les ruptures et les continuités dans les divers réseaux. De même l’espionnage et le contre-espionnage est un désidérata de la recherche ou encore l’importance des acteurs à la périphérie, l’Empire ottoman, les Etats-Unis ou même les provinces italiennes. Le professeur DUCHHARDT s’est également interrogé sur l’importance du centenaire du Congrès en 1914. Un jubilé était-il prévu dans les divers pays européens? Enfin il conviendrait d’effectuer aussi plus de recherches sur les délégations espagnoles, portugaises et suédoises. Ensuite plusieurs questions et commentaires sont venus de la salle. A l’image d’une publication des sources du Congrès sur le modèle des Actes des traités de Westphalie. De même la question de la réception culturelle et la mémoire du Congrès apparait être fondamentale. Une redéfinition de la chronologie et de l’espace apparaît également importante. En Guadeloupe par exemple une bataille a opposé les alliés aux Français le 18 août 1815 (2 mois après Waterloo). 

Enfin les participants ont visité l’exposition Le congrès de Vienne ou l’invention d’une nouvelle Europe au musée Carnavalet. Une table ronde se tenait également dans le salon Bouvier du musée sous la présidence de Thierry LENTZ (Fondation Napoléon). Les participants cosmopolites de la Conférence n’ont finalement pas assisté à cette table ronde « franco-française ».

CONFERENCE REPORT: International Law and Time (Graduate Institute ofInternational and Development Studies, Geneva, 12-13 June 2015) byCharalampos Giannakopoulos

Charalampos Giannakopoulos is a PhD Candidate in International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. His PhD thesis is entitled “The Use and Abuse of Principles in Investment Treaty Arbitration” and his research interests include international adjudication, legal theory and legal philosophy. Mr Giannakopoulos holds a first degree in law from the University of Athens and an LL.M in Public International Law from University College London.

How does the passage of time affect international law? How does it bear on the processes of law-ascertainment and content-determination of legal norms (to borrow the terminology used by Jean d’Aspremont)? Time, we say, is a healer, but can it “heal” grave violations of international law, for instance by restricting access to justice? Is time absolute or rather relative in the way it pertains to law? Can time be used strategically by States, courts, and other international actors? These were some of the questions that led Klara Polackova Van der Ploeg, Luca Pasquet and Leόn Castellanos Jankiewicz (PhD Candidates, Graduate Institute) to convene a two-day conference at Geneva’s Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, under the theme of International Law and Time.

The conference opened with a roundtable, chaired by Professor Andrea Bianchi, (Head of the International Law Department, Graduate Institute) and comprised of Professors Andrew Clapham, Zachary Douglas, Marcelo Kohen, Nico Krisch, and Joost Pauwelyn, teasing out the various themes of the interrelation between international law and the dimension of time that each of the subsequent six panels would then address. 

Panel 1: “Attributing Meaning to Time: Visions of History and Future”, comprised of Dr Juhana Mikael Salojärvi (University of Helsinki) and Professor Timothy Waters (University of Indiana).
Dr Juhana Mikael Salojärvi started by pointing out the importance of the act of “temporalizing” legal concepts throughout history. According to Dr Salojärvi, temporalisation (and therefore time) is a methodological tool at the hands of the legal historian. Dr Salojärvi uses human rights as a case study to demonstrate that the way in which we perceive them over time (i.e. their origins, their changing content throughout human history, the time-frame of our inquiry etc) creates a type of observer effect, as it inevitably changes the human rights narrative that we use.
Professor Timothy Waters then took the floor and argued that, in fulfilling their function, even international courts and tribunals sometimes use or construct certain historical narratives strategically. Professor Waters takes the example of the ICTY and argues that its function both as a criminal court tasked with punishing individual offenders and as an instrument of transitional justice, in a sense “necessitated” the re-construction, by the Tribunal itself, of former Yugoslavia as a good and peaceful place; a place which was destroyed by criminals, and which, through the trials, was meant to be restored and reclaim its place among the European family. Such a linear narrative of history is not necessarily implausible or untrue but, according to Professor Waters, it is strategic.

Panel 2: “The Role of Time in the Creation of Norms”, comprised of Dr Jan Martin Lemnitzer (University of Oxford), Rob Grace (Harvard University), and Tommaso Soave (PhD Candidate, Graduate Institute and WTO) and Shashank Kumar (WTO).
Dr Jan Martin Lemnitzer took us on a trip in history, at the time of the 1856 Paris Declaration. It is there, he argues, that we find the origins of international law as we know it today. The aim of the Paris Declaration was to ban privateering and to protect neutral trade in times of war. In order to achieve these goals, the Declaration pioneered international law in many respects; it was a “law-making treaty” – the first of its kind – allowing all States other than the original drafters to subsequently become parties, thus marking a truly universal turn for international law; it also paved the way forward for holding multilateral norm-setting conferences, and in the process led to the establishment of international lawyers as a distinct profession.
Rob Grace conceptually conceived the development of international normative frameworks as a gradual and incremental process of generating consensus over a long period of time. He used the development of refugee law over three eras (i.e. League of Nations era; period between the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol; post-1967 era) as a case study, to demonstrate how the law protecting refugees has developed incrementally as the result of a “tug-of-war” between evolving humanitarian needs and evolving political interests.
Finally, Tommaso Soave and Shashank Kumar examined time and temporality as dimensions of governance. On the one hand, there is the temporality of iteration and repetition (emphasising effective administration, short-term managerialism and preservation), and, on the other, there is a linear temporality (emphasising notions of progress, improvement, and the achievement of some kind of “master plan”). For Soave and Kumar, different levels of governance employ different temporalities or time-horizons. They thus conceive of domestic governance as employing a (mostly) iterative time-horizon, and international governance as employing a (mostly) linear one. The upshot is that, as the dividing lines between the international and the domestic are blurring, these temporalities – each claiming for itself the authority to regulate aspects of life – at times find themselves in a situation of strategic alliance and at times in a state of conflict.

Panel 3: “Time and the Operation of International Legal Norms”, comprised of Professor Robert Howse (NYU), Dr Panos Merkouris (University of Groningen), and Dr Matthias Vanhullebusch (Shanghai Jiao Tong University).
Professor Robert Howse analysed some of the complications arising out of having different temporalities simultaneous at play in dispute settlement treaties. He takes the example of the three-year time limitation for bringing claims under Article 1116(2) of the NAFTA and examines its relationship with the notion of a breach of an international obligation (especially with regard to continuous or composite breaches) under the general law on State responsibility. For Professor Howse, a time-limit prescription is aimed at stabilising legal relationships and avoiding opportunism, not at extinguishing responsibility for a breach of international law. Thus, time-limit prescriptions and the law of State responsibility need to work side-by-side and in unison, rather than in opposition to one another.
Dr Panos Merkouris then tackled the philosophical question pertaining to the ontological existence of international treaties in space-time and the effects that their ontology has on legal interpretation. Such effects, he argues, are most prominently expressed in the competition between the principles of contemporaneity and evolutive interpretation. According to Dr Merkouris, the only methodologically sound way of determining which of the two interpretative principles ought to guide a treaty’s interpretation is by unearthing the “time-will” of the parties, that is, the intention of the drafters with respect to the effect that time would have on the content of the treaty’s rules.
Lastly, Dr Matthias Vanhullebusch turned our attention to the Chinese conception of time in international law and international relations. Westerners and Easterners, he tells us, adopt two quite different attitudes in international relations. Westerners tend to think in polarised and irreconcilable binaries (e.g. sovereignty v community), conceived in conflicting idealist and realist terms; at each point in time one wins and the other loses. But for Easterners such oppositions are a natural occurrence. Thus, for them the question is not which position wins but how the two can be complemented and balanced in an optimal manner. This, Dr Vanhullebusch says, is the result of two different conceptions of time. Westerners tend to regard time as a linear concept (emphasising the passage from the past to the present and then to the future), whereas Easterners – influenced by Confucian philosophy – regard time as circular (emphasising a complementarity and dialogue between past, present and future). Perhaps also influenced by Confucius, Dr Vanhullebusch suggests that these two different perceptions of the world can find ways to interact and complement one another.

Panel 4: “International Law between Change and Stability”, comprised of Dr Gregory Messenger (University of Oxford), Professor Jaye Ellis (McGill University), and Dr Malcolm MacLaren (University of Zurich).
Dr Gregory Messenger took the floor first. He argued that the need we have of law to provide both certainty and the possibility of change has led us to a representation of time in international law that does not correspond to our common understanding of time as fluid and continuous. More specifically, in the processes of law-identification, interpretation and law-application, judges seek to identify law as frozen in static moments throughout time in order to make their judicial pronouncements (customary law being a case in point). This, Dr Messenger argues, misses the point of how law really develops continuously with the passage of time.
Professor Jaye Ellis advocated the adoption of what can be termed as an “ecosystem approach” to legal systems, and in particular, to international environmental law. For Professor Ellis, legal systems, like natural ecosystems, are better understood as non-linear complex adaptive systems seeking to be “resilient” (i.e. having the: ability to undergo change but to still be able to retain the same functional and structural controls; capability of self-organisation; capacity of learning and adaptation). Understanding international environmental law in this light, Professor Ellis argues, helps us to better address environmental challenges. She accordingly proposes re-focusing academic attention on five constitutive elements of resilience: aggregation (i.e. viewing international environmental law as part of a larger and complex legal system); information flows regarding the content of the rules of the system (in particular by bolstering environmental litigation); non-linearity (i.e. moving away from a simple cause-and-effect outlook and instead taking stock of the fact that regulation in a certain area of law may have unexpected consequences in another area); diversity (in particular by infusing environmental considerations to other areas of international law, such as trade, investment and human rights); and self-critical behaviour (referring to the possibility of a legal system to learn from past mistakes and adapt to changed circumstances).
Panel 4 ended with the contribution of Dr Malcolm MacLaren. Dr MacLaren focused on the contribution of time and societal change in the continuous development of international law. Using the ever-emerging role of non-State actors as his case study, Dr MacLaren argued that it is these factors, namely the passage of time and the societal change that the passage of time brings, that should guide international law’s reformist agenda, rather than our current paradigms.

Panel 5: “Continuity, Discontinuity, Recurrence”, comprised of Professor Patrick Dumberry (University of Ottawa), Dotse Tsikata (UC Davies and African Development Bank), Professor Philipp Kastner (University of Western Australia), and Dr Victor Kattan (National University of Singapore).
In his contribution, Professor Dumberry described the rise, fall, and recent re-emergence of the customary international law minimum standard of treatment (CIL/MST) of aliens in the field of investment protection. As Professor Dumberry points out, the early 20th century glory days of the CIL/MST had been long gone by the 1990s, following criticism regarding its unsettled and ambiguous content and the emergence of FET as an independent standard of treatment in many BITs. This dynamic changed suddenly when investment tribunals started giving broad, divergent and at times idiosyncratic interpretations to FET clauses. Thus, nowadays the treaty practice of many States shows a – somewhat paradoxical – return to the CIL/MST as a kind of “safe haven”. But if the contributions to this conference have taught us anything so far, one must wonder whether referring to the CIL/MST as a standard of treatment frozen in time will be enough to provide States with the clarity and stability they hope for.
Dotse Tsikata called for the creation of a new field of legal scholarship based on the revival of Wolfgang Friedmann’s concept of the International Public Corporation (IPC), as a distinct sub-category of international organisation. According to Tsikata, the concept of the IPC (itself defined as an international corporate body established for purposes of international governance but constituted as a commercial corporation), survives today in institutions such as, among others, the BIS, the World Bank, the IMF, regional development banks, and the ECB. Tsikata’s proposed research agenda involves drawing insights from the structure and inner workings of modern IPCs, to be used in the current debates regarding the governance and accountability of international organisations.
In keeping with the theme of time as linear versus time as circular, Professor Philipp Kastner’s contribution put the proposition forward that international law appears to be increasingly mindful of the dimension of time. Professor Kastner sees this trend in peace agreements negotiated after the end of internal armed conflicts (in particular, in their transitional justice provisions). International law, he argues, now obliges post-conflict societies to engage with the past in fairly specific ways so as to ensure a better future, rather than just mandating to forget or ignore the past (e.g. through a restoration of the status quo ante or by allowing the winner to dictate the new rules of cooperation). As such, international law in this field tends to view time as circular (where past, present, and future are inherently connected), rather than linear (where the past is displaced by the present and this is in turn displaced by the future).
Finally, Dr Victor Kattan continued with the theme of linearity versus circularity by turning our attention to the fact that the formation, the content, and the legal implications of legal norms are inevitably influenced by political ideologies. Dr Kattan examines the principle of self-determination throughout history and concludes that, depending on their ideology, different people mean different things when they use this principle in legal discourse. He identifies, on the one hand, the Wilsonian idea of self-determination (expressed in legal terms in the trusteeship model of the League of Nations and the UN), and on the other, the Leninist conception (reflected in the “Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” in UNGA Resolution 1514). Though the latter understanding of self-determination has replaced the former as customary law, this, Dr Kattan argues, did not happen from one moment to the next but rather as a result of a continuous and gradual process of ideological contestation. Thus, to merely say that self-determination is a principle of customary law is not particularly helpful in cases where the historical element is determinative, as evinced in the recent Mauritius v UK arbitration relating to the establishment of a MPA in the Chagos archipelago (pointing at the fundamentally different conceptions of self-determination advocated by counsel for Mauritius and counsel for the UK).

Panel 6: “Dealing with the Past: Legacy, Retroactivity and Beyond”, comprised of Professor Carsten Stahn (Leiden University), Lorenzo Palestini (PhD Candidate, Graduate Institute), and Professor Asier Garrido-Muñoz (ICJ and University of Salamanca).
Professor Carsten Stahn’s study of international criminal courts and tribunals (ICTs) sought to unpack a concept that is of increasing importance in their work; legacy. Professor Stahn’s contribution first denies the existence of a single conception of legacy. There are, in fact, no less than five different conceptions, tied to the dual – legal and social – function of ICTs (i.e. juridified legacy; systemic/institutional legacy; performative legacy; reproductive legacy; receptive legacy). Following that, Professor Stahn criticises our current understanding that views legacy as a bilateral, seemingly inconspicuous, technical or apolitical process. To the contrary, legacy is a process of social construction that happens gradually and by different actors. It is grounded in social interaction, it is framed through competing narratives and, as such, it evolves over time. Accordingly, criminal ICTs, through their activity, can certainly contribute to the process of legacy formation, but should not try to control or monopolise legacy creation, as they currently seem to be doing.
Ending this panel were the two contributions of Lorenzo Palestini and Professor Asier Garrido-Muñoz. Both participants tackled issues arising out of the former-Yugoslavia cases before the ICJ, and in particular of the 2015 judgment on the merits on Croatia v Serbia. Lorenzo Palestini traced the history of these cases. He argues that, throughout these proceedings, the Court has used the dimension of time strategically. It has done so, first, by applying arbitrarily the Mavrommatis principle to either assume or decline jurisdiction, so that the answer to the question of the critical date with respect to a finding on jurisdiction is still very much unclear. Second, in order to avoid thorny legal questions in the 1996 judgment on the case regarding the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of the Crime of Genocide, the Court created a temporal vacuum which it sought to fill with the (erroneous) retroactive application of the Genocide Convention, a legal determination which it reversed in the 2015 Croatia v Serbia judgment. Third, in its 2015 judgment, the Court found that it had jurisdiction to examine Serbia’s liability without however first examining whether there could be a succession of responsibility to Serbia. For Palestini, this allowed the Court to both bypass this controversial legal question and avoid giving the impression of impunity (for Palestini, the Court already knew that it probably could not condemn Serbia of committing the crime of genocide). The contribution of Professor Asier Garrido-Muñoz focused on the temporal dimension of the succession of federal States with respect to treaties. Examining the 2015 ICJ judgment, Professor Garrido-Muñoz first noticed how the Court dissociated State succession from its principal consequence (i.e. the assumption of international responsibility by the successor, for instance by replacing the predecessor as party to a treaty). He then went on to examine the issue under the law of treaties and the law of State responsibility. Finding that the law on State succession does not take adequate account of the complexities posed by the dissolution of federal States with respect to treaties, Professor Garrido-Muñoz proposes the introduction by analogy (from the law on the responsibility of international organisations) of the criterion of “control of the federal government by a sub-State entity” to bridge the gap.

Thus concluded an intense two days replete with thought-provoking scholarship and stimulating debates among the participants. All in all, this was a very well organised conference on an important topic us lawyers sometimes tend to overlook. Moreover, despite the theoretical outlook and the high level of abstraction of many of the contributions, this conference on International Law and Time left us with some surprisingly practical insights about the function of law, the influence of legal officials and the role of the legal profession in international life.